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I. Introduction
Baland and Robinson (2000) investigate the conditions under which
decisions by parents about their own children’s work are inefficient.
Using a simple two-period model with altruistically linked family mem-
bers, they show that child labor decisions are efficient when credit mar-
kets are perfect and intergenerational altruistic transfers are nonzero.
Moreover, they show that when the level of child labor is inefficient,
because of liquidity constraints or because altruistic transfers are at a
corner, a ban on child labor can be Pareto-improving. We argue here
that the results of Baland and Robinson are significantly altered when
preferences account for the fact that children have a disutility for labor.1
We find that child labor may be Pareto inefficiently high even if markets
are perfect and there are altruistic transfers. This economic inefficiency
is not related to market imperfections, but is a consequence of the
We thank Jean-Marie Baland, Pierre-Andre´ Chiappori, Pierre-Emmanuel Couralet, Paul
Seabright, and participants at the Berkeley Workshop on the Microeconomics of Intra-
household Behavior in 2002 for their comments.
1 Labor disutility is central in the analysis of adult labor supply, and there is no reason
to assume that children, different from adults, do not attach any utility to the kind of
activities they are engaged in. Actually, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted
by the United Nations in 1989, recognizes “the right of the child to rest and leisure, to
engage in play and recreational activities appropriate to the age of the child,” insisting
therefore on the role of activities during childhood on human well-being. Also see Zelizer
(1994) for an interesting analysis of the changing social value of children that motivates
the importance of accounting for labor disutilities of children.
comments 241
noncooperative game in which altruistic parents are involved. Moreover,
once labor disutility is introduced, the conditions under which an ex-
ogenous reduction of child labor can be Pareto-improving are less likely
to be fulfilled. Section II introduces the model. Section III studies the
efficiency of the allocation of child labor. Section IV analyzes the effects
of a marginal ban on child labor. Section V presents a conclusion.
II. The Model
Our model is the same as in Baland and Robinson (2000), with the
difference that child utility in the first period is no longer exogenous
but depends on the level of child labor. When we write for the timelc
the child spends at work, the adulthood consumption of children,cc
and the parent’s consumption during period i, the child’s and parents’icp
utilities are respectively given by
W p V (1 l ) V (c ) lW ,c 1 c 2 c p
1 2W p U(c ) U(c ) dW ,p p p c
where and represent the altruism parameters. Thel  (0, 1) d  (0, 1)
functions U, V1, and V2 are increasing and concave. A child that spends
time at work earns in the first period and acquires a level of humanl lc c
capital providing earnings of in the second period (the functionh(1 l )c
is strictly increasing and concave, and we normalize ).2h(7) h(0)p 1
Denote by A the exogenous income of parents in each period, s the
savings of parents from the first period, b the bequests they leave to
children, and t the transfers that children give to their parents when
adults. Then it is straightforward to see that parents are willing to
maximize
1 2U(c ) U(c ) dV (1 l ) dV (c )p p 1 c 2 cW pp 1 dl
under their first- and second-period budget constraints 1c p A l  sp c
and . Children’s objective is to maximize2c p A b s tp
1 2V (1 l ) V (c ) lU(c ) lU(c )p p1 c 2 cW pc 1 dl
under the budget constraint . The timing of de-c p h(1 l ) b tc c
cisions and allocation of decision power are as in Baland and Robinson
(2000). Parents choose child labor and savings s in the first period.lc
2 In this section and in Sec. III, wages for an efficient unit of labor are exogenous and
are set equal to one for simplicity. Wages will be endogenous and will be explicitly intro-
duced in Sec. IV, where general equilibrium effects are considered.
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In the second period, parents choose bequests b, and then children
choose transfers t conditionally on child labor, savings, and bequests.
It is clear that only the net transfer matters for the adult con-b t
sumption of children and for the second-period consumption of par-
ents. Central in the model is that parents anticipate transfers from chil-
dren when they choose the investment in human capital of their
children (and consequently child labor) as well as savings and bequests.
III. Inefficient Family Choices of Child Labor
In Baland and Robinson (2000), when capital markets are perfect, ef-
ficiency is attained as soon as net transfers are nonzero. When transfers
flow from parents to children, this result extends to the case in which
there is disutility of child labor.3 However, in this section, we show that,
in the presence of child labor disutility, Baland and Robinson’s conclu-
sion does not hold when net transfers flow from children to parents.
Proposition 1. When labor has a nonzero disutility and when net
transfers from children to parents are positive, the “laissez-faire” level
of child labor is inefficiently high.
Proof. When net transfers are positive (then we can arbitrarilyt b
set and ), the first-order condition on children’s transfers tobp 0 t 1 0
parents is
′ ′V (h(1 l ) b t)p lU (A b s t). (1)2 c
For parents, the first-order conditions for and s are, respectively,lc
t t′ 1 ′ 2 ′ ′ ′U (c ) U (c ) p dV (1 l ) dV (c ) h (1 l ) (2)p p 1 c 2 c c[ ]l lc c
and
t t′ 1 ′ ′ 2 ′ 2U (c ) dV (c ) p U (c ) U (c ) . (3)p 2 c p p
s s
From conditions (2) and (3) we get
t t t t′ 2 ′ ′ ′U (c ) 1  p dV (1 l ) dV (c ) h (1 l )  . (4)p 1 c 2 c c( ) [ ]l s l sc c
3 Actually when bequests, b, are greater than t, i.e., when net transfers go from parents
to children, the model gives the same outcome as a model in which parents decide for
everything. Efficiency is then obviously reached, thanks to parental altruism, no matter
the disutility of child labor.
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Deriving (1) with respect to and s, we obtainlc
t t ′ ′ h (1 l ) h (1 l )p 0.c c
l sc
Then (4) can be rewritten as
t t′ 2 ′ ′ ′ ′U (c )[1 h (1 l )] 1 p dV (1 l ) dV (c )[1 h (1 l )]p c 1 c 2 c c( )s s
′ ′ ′p d V (1 l ) V (c )[1 h (1 l )]1 c 2 c c{
t′ ′ V (c )[1 h (1 l )] 1 ,2 c c ( )}s
implying finally
′ ′ ′d{V (1 l ) V (c )[1 h (1 l )]}p1 c 2 c c
t′ 2 ′ ′[U (c ) dV (c )][1 h (1 l )] 1 . (5)p 2 c c ( )s
Since , we know that and′ 2 ′t b 1 0 U (c ) dV (c ) 1 0p 2 c
′′t V (c )2 c1 p 1 0.′′ ′′ 2s V (c ) lU (c )2 c p
We denote by the efficient level of child labor, satisfying∗lc
′ ∗ ′ ′ ∗V (1 l ) V (c )[1 h (1 l )]p 0. (6)1 c 2 c c
Since because there is disutility from child labor,′ ∗ ∗1 h (1 l ) 1 0 lc c
cannot be a solution of (5). Moreover, we can show that the level of
child labor that follows from our model is greater than the efficient∗∗lc
one, . Indeed, with∗lc
′ ′ ′F(l )p V (1 l ) V (c )[1 h (1 l )]c 1 c 2 c c
and
t′ 2 ′ ′W(l )p [U (c ) dV (c )][1 h (1 l )] 1 ,c p 2 c c ( )s
we know from (5) that is a solution of and is a∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗l dF(l )p W(l ) lc c c c
solution of . Now, note from equation (6) that∗ ′F(l )p 0 1 h (1c
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, so that for all because h is strictly concave.∗ ′ ∗l ) 1 0 1 h (1 l ) 1 0 l ! lc c c c
This implies that
F ′′ ′ ′′ ′(l )p V (1 l ) h (1 l )V (c )[1 h (1 l )]c 1 c c 2 c c
lc
′ ′′ V (c )h (1 l ) 1 02 c c
for all and, since , that is negative for all .∗ ∗ ∗l ! l F(l )p 0 F(l ) l ! lc c c c c c
Thus the solution of can be reached only for .∗∗ ∗dF(l )p W(l ) l 1 lc c c c
In contrast to the results of Baland and Robinson, this proposition
shows that savings or transfers need not be at a corner for there to be
an inefficient supply of child labor. The inefficiency of child time al-
location does not necessarily rely on capital market imperfections, but
may result only from the inability of family ties, driven by altruism, to
reach efficient outcomes.4 More precisely, the inefficiency obtained here
follows from a failure of the Rotten Kid theorem (Bergstrom 1989;
Becker 1991) in a particular setting in which the first action is decided
by the parents and the transfers are chosen by the children (compared
to Becker’s “Rotten Kid theorem,” the roles of parents and children are
therefore reversed, which explains our use of the term “rotten parents”).
The disutility of child labor is central since it generates a breakdown
of the “transferable utility condition,” which is a necessary condition
for the Rotten Kid theorem to hold (Bergstrom 1989). Note that (5)
implies that the choice of child labor in this model, , is such that∗∗lc
′ ∗∗h (1 l ) ! 1. (7)c
This means that child labor is at a lower level than in the model with
no labor disutility, where we would have . In other words,′ ∗∗h (1 l )p 1c
two-sided altruism allows the disutility of child labor to be taken into
account by reducing its level, but not by enough to reach the efficient
level.
IV. The Effect of a Marginal Ban on Child Labor
Once it has been shown that child labor may be inefficiently high, it is
rather natural, as in Baland and Robinson’s article, to think of a policy
consisting in imposing a reduction of child labor. At first, it is clear that
if we ignore the effects of the variation of child labor supply on wages
(i.e., in a partial equilibrium), a marginal ban on child labor has a
4 If intergenerational contracts were possible, the optimal outcome could be reached
with contracts in which children commit to paying their parents in exchange for appro-
priate levels of labor and education. However, such contracts may be problematic since
they rely on the possibility for children to commit and for the family, or the credit insti-
tutions, to enforce such contracts.
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negative impact on parents’ utility and a positive impact on child welfare.
A ban on child labor is therefore not Pareto-improving unless general
equilibrium effects generate enough beneficial wage adjustments for
parents. Whether this will occur depends on the elasticities of the wage
rates to the amount of efficient units of labor demanded. As in Baland
and Robinson’s article, it is possible to express the conditions for a ban
on child labor to be Pareto-improving. Writing and for the wagesw wc1 c2
per unit of efficient child and adult labor, for the elasticity of chil-ec1
dren’s wage to child labor in the first period, and for the elasticityec2
of the adult wage to adult labor in the second period, we obtain three
conditions for a marginal ban on child labor to be Pareto-improving
(see the Appendix). The first condition ensures that child welfare in-
creases, and this condition is not affected by the disutility of labor. The
second, concerning the effect on parents’ welfare, is very likely to hold
when the altruism parameters are not too large. The third condition,
which is the most interesting for our discussion, ensures that a ban will
increase firms’ profit, namely
wc2′e ≤ e h .c1 c2 wc1
Although this condition seems identical to the one derived in Baland
and Robinson, it is less likely to hold when labor disutility is introduced.
In their article, inefficient levels of child labor are such that ′h w 1c2
. Thus the condition above is fulfilled if, for example, the elasticitieswc1
are the same. However, in our case, (this comes from ine-′h w ! wc2 c1
quality [7] when wages are explicitly reintroduced). It implies that this
inequality is more restrictive and less likely to hold. For example, if
elasticities are identical, a ban on child labor cannot be Pareto-improv-
ing since it is costly for firms.5 More generally, the greater the disutility
of labor, the smaller is at the optimum and the less likely it is′h w /wc2 c1
that firms will be favorable to a ban on child labor.
V. Conclusion
We have shown that considering labor disutility leads to a significant
revision of the analysis of child labor developed by Baland and Robinson.
In particular, when there is disutility of labor, decisions regarding child
labor and human capital investment are inefficient even if household
members are altruistic, transfers are not at a corner, and there are no
market imperfections, provided that net transfers do not flow from
parents to children. Also, labor disutility reduces the likelihood that a
marginal ban on child labor will be Pareto-improving. Our paper stresses
5 We assume, like Baland and Robinson (2000), that profits are not redistributed.
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that when parents are not altruistic enough, there is a rotten parents
effect in which parents rationally sacrifice some childhood utility and
choose a level of child labor that is inefficiently high. This result holds
even if parents expect to receive transfers in the later period of their
life. In fact, as soon as preferences include child labor disutility, parents’
and children’s utilities are not transferable and the existence of altruistic
family transfers does not guarantee that the family chooses an efficient
level of child labor. Recent developments in family economics tend to
explore collective decision processes involving household members (see,
e.g., Browning and Chiappori 1998). Cooperation between spouses,
which is a key assumption in a number of papers, is something that is
intensively discussed and has been the object of many recent empirical
studies focusing on gender issues. However, very few have focused on
the problem of cooperation between generations. Cooperation across
generations within the family is even less able to be taken for granted
and is at least as important when human capital investments are
considered.
Appendix
General Equilibrium Effects of a Ban on Child Labor
In this Appendix, we provide the formal conditions for a ban on child labor to
be Pareto-improving. We use the following definition of wage elasticities:
l wc c1
e p ,c1 w lc1 c
h(1 l ) w 1 w hc c2 c2
e p p . (A1)c2 ′w h(1 l ) w l hc2 c c2 c
Proposition 2. When we take into account the general equilibrium effects, a
marginal ban on child labor is Pareto-improving whenever the three following
inequalities simultaneously hold:
w h 1 wc2 c2′ ′e ≤ 1,  e ≤e h ,  e h ≤e ,c2 c1 c2 c2 c1w h g wc1 c1
where is the ratio of absolute risk aversion at the optimum con-hp j /jU V2
sumption of parents and children in the second period, and is thegp 1/dl
inverse of the product of caring parameters.
Proof. Firms’ profits will be increasing with a marginal reduction of child labor
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whenever (see Baland and Robinson 2000, p. 676). For par-′e w ≤e h wc1 c1 c2 c2
ents’ welfare, using the envelope theorem for savings adjustment, we get
dW w tp c1′ 1 ′ 2p U (c ) w  l  U (c )p c1 c p( )dl l lc c c
w tc2′ ′ ′ dV (1 l ) dV (c ) h(1 l )w h (1 l )1 c 2 c c c2 c[ ]l lc c
since , , and . Using1 2c p Aw l  s c p A b s t c p w h(1 l ) b tp c1 c p c c2 c
the first-order condition of parents’ maximization with respect to ,lc
t t′ 1 ′ 2 ′ ′ ′U (c )w U (c ) p dV (1 l ) dV (c ) h (1 l )w  ,p c1 p 1 c 2 c c c2[ ]l lc c
we get
dW w wp c1 c2′ 1 ′p U (c )l  dV (c ) h(1 l ).p c 2 c cdl l lc c c
Using the first-order condition of children’s maximization with respect to t,
, we get′ ′ 2V (c )p lU (c )2 c p
dWp ′ 1 ′ 2 ′p U (c )w e  dlU (c )h w e .p c1 c1 p c2 c2dlc
Using the first-order condition on savings,
t t′ 1 ′ 2U (c )p U (c ) 1  dl ,p p ( )s s
we obtain
dW t tp ′ 2 ′p U (c ) 1  dl w e  dlh w e .p c1 c1 c2 c2( )[ ]dl s sc
Denoting by andgp 1/dl (1, )
′′ 2 ′′j U (c ) V (c )pU 2 c
hp p ,′ 2 ′Zj U (c ) V (c )V p 2 c2
the ratio of absolute risk aversion at optimum consumption, we have
′′ 2t lU (c ) hp
p p′′ ′′ 2s V (c ) lU (c ) h 12 c p
because . Therefore,′ ′ 2lp V (c )/U (c )2 c p
t t h g
1  dl w e p dl w ec1 c1 c1 c1( )s s 1 h
and if and only ifdW /dl ≤ 0p c
h 1 wc2 ′e h ≤e .c2 c1
h gwc1
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As for children’s welfare, using the first-order conditions and (A1), we get
dW w wc c2 c1′ ′ ′ ′ 1pV (1 l ) V (c ) hw h  lU (c ) l1 c 2 c c2 p c( )dl l lc c c
t t′ ′ 2 ′pV (1 l ) lU (c )w h (1 e ) 1  dl w e .1 c p c2 c2 c1 c1( )[ ]s s
We know that
t t
1  dl 1 0
s s
and . So as soon as .e ! 0 dW /dl ! 0 e ≤ 1c1 c c c2
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